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INTRODUCTION  
Obstetric Violence (OV) – mistreatment, abusive, or disrespectful treatment of women in 
childbirth - has gained increasing attention in recent years. However, there is little research 
on its legal aspects,1 including the question of whether it is or should be a target of the 
criminal law, though there are at least three jurisdictions in Latin America where specific 
statutes protecting women against OV have been enacted.2 And, in the South African context, 
Pickles has argued that OV should be criminalised there.3 This chapter provides the first 
exploration of the question of criminalisation of OV in England and Wales.  
OV is identified in the literature as a form of gender-based violence: it is directed against 
women and stems from patriarchal gender norms.4 Recognition that an act of violence is a 
form of violence against women, reveals not only the harm done to the individual victim, but 
also the role such violence plays in reinforcing gender norms and oppression of women in 
general. Traditionally, however, violence against women has been unacknowledged and 
minimized (for example domestic violence, marital rape), not only in society but in law, and 
the criminal law has struggled to accommodate women’s experiences of abuse and violence.5  
Feminist analyses show that the law is patriarchal6 and that criminal law doctrine is based on 
the male, not the female, subject.7 Historically, the male character of the criminal law is most 
evident in, for example, the common law defence of provocation which in its classic 
formulation facilitated lenient treatment for killings done in ‘righteous male anger’ – the 
murder of an unfaithful wife and/or her lover, being the quintessential example8 – and the 
way the offence of rape was originally conceived of as a crime against the property interests 
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of the victim’s husband or father.9 As Nicolson has observed: ‘The criminal legal subject is 
male… [I]t is [male] behaviour which informs the norms of criminal law and the response of 
actors of the criminal justice system’.10  
In recent decades, there has been increasing feminist focus on criminal law reform to address 
the law’s gender bias against women. This has met with some success, such as through 
replacing provocation with a new defence of loss of control,11 reforming rape laws,12 and the 
introduction of new offences to target gender-based violence such as domestic abuse13 and 
‘revenge porn’.14 The government has also recently announced plans to criminalise 
‘upskirting’.15 Recently, feminist scholars have also highlighted the need to create specific 
offences to capture the gendered harms that women experience in the context of image-based 
sexual abuse.16  
It is against this context – the gendered nature of OV, and the law’s inherent maleness and 
consequent historical failing to address the concerns of women - that the issue of enacting a 
specific offence of OV is considered. It will be argued that the criminalisation of OV requires 
a specific statutory crime. From the outset, it is important to highlight, that my suggestion is 
not that all instances of mistreatment identified in the literature be subject to the criminal law, 
and more will be said on that as the argument develops. However, what is important is that 
the law takes an approach focused on women’s experiences of violence and which seeks to 
challenge the gender norms on which OV is based. While the discussion will focus on the 
legal position in England and Wales, much of what is said will be applicable to other 
jurisdictions, at least those with a similar social, cultural and legal context. 
Section 1 outlines the concept of OV and explains its conception as a form of gender-based 
violence. Section 2, focusing on non-fatal offences against the person (NFOAP) and the new 
wilful neglect and ill-treatment offences found in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
(CJCA), explores limitations of the current criminal law with regard to targeting abusive 
treatment of women in childbirth. Following on from this discussion, it is argued in section 3 
that a specific offence of OV which takes a woman-centred approach would: first,  identify 
abuse of women in childbirth as a matter that demands a specific criminal response, draw 
attention to this issue and properly label the wrong/harm involved; and, second, enable the 
law to be formulated to take account of the particular experiences of women in childbirth.  
Section 4 will conclude the chapter.    
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1. OV – MEANING, SCOPE, AND ITS GENDERED ROOTS 
‘OV’ is a broad concept used by activists and writers to draw attention to and address 
mistreatment of women in childbirth.17 Other terminology describing the phenomenon 
include ‘disrespect and abuse’ of women in childbirth, ‘dehumanised care’, ‘birth rape’, 
‘mistreatment of women’ and ‘childbirth abuse’.18 There is no consensus on the terminology. 
Some writers use the terms interchangeably, while others seek to distinguish ‘mistreatment’ 
from ‘violence’ on the ground that the former is a more inclusive term that captures the 
broader range of experiences described in the research.19 In this chapter, I will mainly rely on 
the term OV, but I will also use other terminology, such as ‘abuse’ and ‘mistreatment’. 
Although I recognise that these terms could hold different meanings, and that there is a wider 
debate about appropriate terminology, I will use them interchangeably.   
Although there is no settled definition, Chadwick summarises the consensus: ‘OV includes 
both direct violence (physical, verbal and sexual abuse), subtler forms of emotional violence 
(dehumanization, disrespect, and undignified care) and structural violence (stigma, 
discrimination, and systematic deficiencies).’20 It covers a wide range of conduct, perpetrated 
with different degrees of culpability, and includes (but is not limited to) the following 
examples: forced/non-consented to medical procedures (e.g. caesarean sections, episiotomies, 
inductions, forceps delivery, vaginal examinations); unnecessary, but apparently consented 
to, medical treatments; withholding medical treatment/pain relief; slapping, pinching, 
restraining of women during labour; verbal and emotional abuse (e.g. shouting, threats, 
coercion, being lied to obtain compliance/consent); neglect; and disrespectful treatment (e.g. 
putting the needs of the care-provider ahead of those of the woman; ignoring the woman’s 
embodied experience).21 A key aspect of OV is that it undermines, indeed strips women of 
their, autonomy and dignity. 22 Understanding these examples of abuse/mistreatment as 
‘violence’, takes the concept of violence beyond traditional accounts which view violence as 
involving a physical attack. Indeed,  as a concept, OV intentionally ‘confront[s] problematic 
practices, which have often been hidden, invisible, unacknowledged, as forms of violence’,23 
and ‘seek[s] to name phenomena which are not easily or normatively recognised as forms of 
violence … as violence’.24 Thus, OV serves to reveal and identify what is otherwise hidden 
and to challenge minimization of women’s experiences of abuse in childbirth.   
 
17 For example, see Dixon (n 2); Rachelle Chadwick, ‘Obstetric Violence in South Africa’ (2016) 106(5) South 
African Medical Journal 423. 
18 JP Vogel et al, ‘Promoting Respect and Preventing Mistreatment During Childbirth’ (2015) An International 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 671, 672; Rachelle Chadwick, ‘Ambiguous Subjects: Obstetric 
Violence, Assemblage and South African Birth Narratives’ (2017) 27(4) Feminism & Psychology 489, 491; 
Meghan A Bohren et al, ‘The Mistreatment of Women during Childbirth in Health Facilities Globally: A Mixed-
Methods Systematic Review’ (2015) 12(6) PloS Med.   
19 Bohren et al (n 18). 
20 Chadwick (n 18) 492.  
21 For examples see: Vogel (n 18) 672; Chadwick (n 18) 491-92; Ana Flávia Pires Lucas d’Oliveira, Simone 
Grilo Diniz & Lilia Blima Schraiber, ‘Violence Against Women in Health-Care Institutions: An Emerging 
Problem’ (2002) 359 The Lancet 1681, 1681-83; Bohren (n 18). 
22 Joanna N Erdman, ‘Bioethics, Human Rights, and Childbirth’ (2015) 17(1) Health and Human Rights 43, 45; 
Bohren et al (n 18) 
23 Chadwick (n 17) 423. 
24 Chadwick (n 18) 492.  
The concept of OV emerged in the fight for a humanised approach to childbirth, and sought 
to highlight the damage perpetrated on women by medicalised childbirth.25 As such, it 
embraces routine obstetric practices in a technological age within medical settings, 
identifying the unnecessary/improper use of routine bio-medical interventions as ‘violence’.26 
Consequently, OV may be perpetrated by individual care providers (e.g. midwives, 
obstetricians), and at a systematic level by health institutions and services through their 
policies, protocols, working environments and resources. Indeed, as Freedman and Kruk have 
summarised, research shows that ‘this is not the phenomenon of a few bad apples. Rather, it 
runs wide and deep in the maternity services of many countries.’27  
Mistreatment and abuse of women in childbirth is a global phenomenon. Although much of 
the literature has focused on Latin American and African countries,28 there is also evidence of 
women’s experiences of mistreatment in childbirth in high income settings.29 For example, 
Reed et al in their study of women who experienced post-birth trauma across a number of 
countries, including Australia, North America and Europe, highlighted that many women 
reported being lied to and threatened to get their agreement to medical interventions. These 
threats often focused on the welfare of the baby (‘the dead baby threat’); that a caesarean 
would be performed without consent; or that the woman would be reported to social services, 
and her baby taken from her, if she did not comply with medical authority. 30 Women’s 
experiences of trauma included violence and physical abuse, and they used language 
associated with sexual assault to describe these experiences.31 An English study by Baker et 
al highlighted a number of examples of mistreatment of women in childbirth, including 
problems in relation to decision-making with regard to obstetric interventions such as 
episiotomies and inductions.32  Women in this study indicated that they had little choice over 
decisions about such procedures in that they were given inadequate information by staff 
and/or that their preferences and embodied experiences were ignored. Some women reported 
that they were ‘talked into’ or ‘bullied’ to obtain their consent.33  
 
25 ibid 491.  
26 Dixon (n 2) 437-38, 441-42. 
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Global Quality and Accountability Agendas’ (2014) 384 The Lancet 42. See also Rachel Jewkes, Naeemah 
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Services’ 47(11) (1998) Soc. Sci. Med. 1781, 1791-92; d’Oliveira et al (n 21) 1683.   
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29 See Sarah R Baker et al, ‘ “I Felt as Though I’d Been in Jail”: Women’s Experiences of Maternity Care 
During Labour, Delivery and the Immediate Postpartum’ (2005) 15(3) Feminism & Psychology 315 (England 
and Wales study); Bohren et al (n 18) (systematic review of 65 studies across 34 countries, including high-
income settings); Rachel Reed, Rachael Sharman & Christian Inglis, ‘Women’s Descriptions of Childbirth 
Trauma Relating to Care Provider Actions and Interactions’ (2017) 17 BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth 21 
(world-wide study, mainly comprised of participants from Australia, Oceania, North America and Europe); 
Diaz-Tello (n 1) (discussing forced caesarean sections in the USA).  
30 Reed et al (n 29) 25. 
31 ibid 25-26. 
32 Baker et al (n 29) 324-25 
33 ibid. 324. 
OV is identified as a form of gender-based violence.34 In other words, it stems from and 
reflects oppressive cultural attitudes to women and wider structural gender inequality.35 As 
highlighted by Dixon, ‘how women are treated in labour and birth … mirrors how they are 
treated in society….’36 A number of researchers have identified parallels between OV and 
intimate-partner violence because similar coercive tactics are employed to those used by 
abusive men (e.g. manipulation, intimidation, violence) and because it is based on gender 
norms.37  
Although all patients are susceptible to paternalistic medical practices and infringements of 
their autonomy in medical decision-making, as Dodds has highlighted, women are especially 
vulnerable in this respect, particularly in the context of reproductive health decisions: 
patriarchy, the choices women have to make, and normative ideas that women are ‘irrational’ 
mean that their autonomy is undermined.38 Specifically in relation to childbirth, it is 
understood that the relationship between birthing women and their midwives/obstetricians is 
affected by oppressive patriarchal gender norms about the value of women and how ‘good’ 
women/mothers should behave. In her South African study into why midwives abuse their 
patients, Chadwick found that ‘… class, racialized and gendered imperatives about “good 
mothers” and “good women” intertwine[] with medical norms surrounding the ideal of the 
‘good patient’, to create relational networks of discipline, punishment, normalizing judgment 
and coercion.’39 The role of patriarchal gender norms that devalue women are also found in 
high-resource settings and ‘Western’ cultures where prominent ideals of ‘maternal sacrifice’, 
which expect that women put their babies first, even where this is against their own interests, 
make them more susceptible to medical authority, pressure and abuse.40   
Related to this is the cultural value of the foetus, and the impact of advances in technology on 
medical perceptions of the foetus as a ‘second-patient’.41 This can create a maternal-foetal 
conflict, in medical eyes, with, in more extreme cases, medical personnel viewing their role 
as being to protect the foetus/baby against its’ mother.42 Fear of civil liability if the child is 
injured through negligent medical treatment during childbirth, may also make medical 
 
34 For example, see Rachel Jewkes & Loveday Penn-Kekana, ‘Mistreatment of Women in Childbirth: Time for 
Action on This Important Dimension of Violence Against Women’ (2015) PLoS Med e1001849; Dixon (n 2)  
35 Jewkes & Penn-Kekana (n 34). 
36 Dixon (n 2) 447. 
37 For further discussion, see Jonathan Herring in this collection. See also Dixon (n 2) 447-50; Sonya Charles, 
‘Obstetricians and Violence Against Women’ (2011) 11(12) The American Journal of Bioethics 51; Meghan A 
Bohren et al, ‘“By slapping their laps the patient will know that you truly care for her”: A Qualitative Study of 
Social Norms and Acceptability of the Mistreatment of Women During Childbirth in Abuja, Nigeria’ (2016) 2 
Population Health  640, 642.   
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40 See generally, Pam Lowe, Reproductive Health and Maternal Sacrifice: Women, Choice and Responsibility 
(Palgrave-Macmillan; 2016), esp chs 2, 5 & 6. 
41 Samantha Halliday, Autonomy and Pregnancy: A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention 
(Routledge, 2016) 1-4; Sheena Meredith, Policing Pregnancy: the Law and Ethics of Obstetric Conflict 
(Ashgate, 2005), 1-2, 5-6. 
42 Oberman (n 1) 451-52. 
professionals/institutions push for certain kinds of treatment or intervention against the 
wishes of the birthing woman. As Baker et al argue, in relation to their English study:  
‘The pursuit of the “birth machine” with its ever-increasing use and reliance on 
technologies and interventions … enacted within a fetocentric environment in which 
the life of the foetus … and fear of litigation dominate, mean that the rhetoric of 
informed choice … is just that – rhetoric…. In the context of childbirth, “choice” is 
potentially coercive as it ignores the asymmetrical relations and the cultural 
impediments enforced through the obstetric hegemony, which operates within a 
patriarchal culture.’43 
Thus, ideals of maternal sacrifice and ‘good’ motherhood, alongside an increased focus on 
foetal safety and welfare, can make women in childbirth more vulnerable to abuse, and, in 
particular, to treatment that undermines autonomy.  
The question I seek to address in this chapter is the role of the criminal law in responding to 
this. In the following section, I explore the limits of the criminal law in responding to OV, 
before examining the potential of existing offences to capture some examples of OV.   
 
2. Criminalising Obstetric Violence   
My argument proceeds on the basis that at least some of the harms perpetrated on women by 
abusive obstetric practices merit criminalisation, and, indeed, as explored in this section, are 
already potentially captured by existing offences. Taking this as my starting point, I will 
argue that if we seek to criminalise OV, what is needed is a specific statutory offence. As I 
demonstrate, while existing offences might be used to target obstetric abuse, they may not be 
particularly effective at capturing the gendered violence involved. A specific offence would 
not only label the crime correctly, it would also enable the law to take account of and respond 
to the role of gender norms in the perpetration of abusive obstetric practices, and the gender-
based harms perpetrated on childbearing women, notably, but not exclusively, those 
involving autonomy-infringements. A specific offence may also serve to challenge 
oppression of women in this context, and resist minimization of their experiences of abuse.  
As explained, OV is a broad and somewhat ill-defined spectrum ranging from relatively 
minor (e.g. being rude or disrespectful in attitude) to very serious harms/wrongs (e.g. forced 
medical procedures). From a legal perspective, the issue is what role the criminal law can 
play in relation to some, but not all, instances of OV. There are complex issues that arise 
when considering questions of whether conduct could be criminalised, including practical 
considerations such as what we might seek to achieve by criminalisation; and whether this 
would be best realised through the criminal law, or whether other forms of legal regulation 
would provide a more effective response.44 We also must be cognisant of the limits of the 
 
43 Baker et al (n 29) 334. 
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Karen Yeung & Jeremy Horder, ‘How Can the Criminal Law Support the Provision of Quality in Healthcare?’ 
(2014) BMJ Qual Saf Published Online First: [March 5, 2014], 1, 2.  
criminal law. Indeed, whilst criminalisation may be appealing, it should never be taken 
lightly because, unlike with other forms of legal regulation, it involves the coercive power of 
the state, allowing for state punishment and condemnation of wrong-doing.45 The criminal 
law, therefore, should be used with restraint. For example, Mill’s ‘harm principle’,46 which is 
often  considered central to the question of the limits of the criminal law, argues that the only 
rationale for criminalisation is the prevention of harm to others, which means that 
criminalisation is justified if it will prevent harm.47 This approach does not mandate 
criminalisation in such circumstances, however; it merely permits it, and there will be other 
factors to take into account.48  
One of the restrictions generally accepted by theorists on the scope of the criminal law is that, 
due to the significant consequences of criminalisation for individuals, we should only 
criminalise serious blameworthy harms.49  This would suggest that only serious incidents of 
OV would lend themselves to criminalisation. However, although I do not wish to suggest 
that mistreatment of women in childbirth always warrants criminalisation, we should, 
following what was said in the previous section,50 guard against trivialisation of birthing 
women’s experiences of violence. In particular, in determining what merits a criminal 
response it is necessary to challenge the criminal law’s traditional male approach to violence 
and harm. The question of what conduct would cross the threshold to become the concern of 
the criminal law should be informed by women’s experiences and cognisant of and 
responsive to the gendered roots of the harm involved. What might appear to be ‘trivial’ on 
an objective assessment, may take on a different level of gravity when considered from the 
perspective of women in labour and when account is taken of the gendered nature of the 
violence involved. First, as noted above, in the OV literature, the term ‘violence’ is used to 
describe phenomena not normally viewed as violent51 and it would be important that the law 
took a broad approach to conceptualising violence. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Yemshaw 
recognised that for the purposes of the Housing Act 1996, domestic violence included 
emotional, psychological and financial abuse.52 Traditionally the criminal law’s offences of 
violence (NFOAP, discussed below) have focused on requirements of physical touching 
and/or injury of a particular nature (either physical or psychiatric) and degree.53 As Herring 
argues, referring to this issue in the context of domestic violence, the law ignores the impact 
of the context of the relationship in which the violence occurred as well as the broader social 
 
45 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Conceptions of Overcriminalization’ (2008) 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 407, 
408, 410; Douglas Husak, ‘The Criminal Law as Last Resort’ (2004) 24(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
207; AP Simester, et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (6th ed, Hart Publishing, 
2016) 659-60.  
46 John S Mill, On Liberty (1859), ch 1.  
47 For example, see generally, Jonathan Herring, Great Debates in Criminal Law (3rd ed, Palgrave, 2015), ch 1; 
Simester (n 45) 660-667. 
48 ibid.  
49 For example, see Ashworth (n 45).   
50 See discussion above at nn 23-24. 
51 ibid. 
52 J Herring, ‘The Meaning of Domestic Violence: Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow [2001] UKSC 3’ 
(2001) 33(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 297.  
53 In the offences of battery/assault; Actual Bodily Harm; Wounding or Grievous Bodily Harm, discussed below 
section 2.b.  
context when considering the severity of the attack; this can mean that women’s experiences 
of violence are trivialised within the traditional criminal law framework.54 Second, 
recognising that OV is form of gender-based violence also increases its seriousness because 
not only is the injury to the individual victim identified, but so too is the wider public harm in 
terms of the role this violence plays in oppression of women in general. 
Notwithstanding this, it seems there will be examples of OV that would not be serious 
enough to warrant criminal sanction. An example might be where a midwife/obstetrician 
spoke to a woman in a harsh or demeaning way (though there may be situations where verbal 
abuse would cross the threshold).  Further, even if serious harm was caused, there would be 
no criminalisation in the absence of fault (e.g. if it was caused accidentally). However, there 
are other instances of abuse/mistreatment that should attract the attention of the criminal law, 
such as, for example: deliberately withholding pain relief, where this was not warranted on 
medical grounds; and blameworthy autonomy-infringements, such as that which occurs 
where medical procedures are performed without consent, or where women submit to 
medical procedures/examinations due to improper pressure, lies, lack of information, or 
threats. Indeed, as in explored in the following section, some of these examples are already 
captured by the criminal law.  
2.a Obstetric Violence under Current Offences  
Historically the criminal law has had little to do with medical practice, and, except in cases 
where death was caused through gross negligence, medical professionals had not faced 
criminalisation for harms perpetrated on their patients.55 The Francis Report into serious 
mistreatment and neglect of patients at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust highlighted the 
inadequacies of the existing criminal law framework, namely that, unless it could be shown 
that death had resulted, it was impossible to criminalise medical professionals who 
mistreated, neglected or abused patients in their care.56  Consequently, two new offences 
were created, which are largely concerned with criminalising poor, abusive or unsafe 
(medical) care. Sections 20 and 21 of the CJCA 2015 specifically target ‘care workers’ 
(including medical professionals) and ‘care providers’ (for example NHS Trusts). The section 
20 offence criminalises individuals who ill-treat or wilfully neglect those in their care.57 The 
section 21 crime criminalises ‘care providers’, and would enable criminalisation of, for 
example, an NHS Trust, where a medical professional ill-treated/wilfully neglected a patient; 
the Trust’s activities were organised or managed in a way which amounted to a gross breach 
of a relevant duty of care to the patient; and in the absence of such breach, the ill-
treatment/neglect would not have occurred or would have been less likely to occur.   
 
54 Herring (n 52) 300-301. 
55 Hannah Quirk, ‘Sentencing White Coat Crime: the Need for Guidance in Medical Manslaughter Cases’ 
[2013] 11 Crim. L.R. 871-72; Amel Alghrani et al, ‘Healthcare Scandals in the NHS: Crime and Punishment’ 
(2011) 37 J Med Ethics 230.  
56 Robert Francis QC, Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry  (2013, London: 
The Stationery Office). For discussion see Alghrani et al (n 55); Yeung & Horder (n 44).  
57 For a brief outline, see Zia Akhar, ‘Vulnerable Patients, Wilful Neglect and Proof of Sufficient Certainty: Part 
1’ (2017) 181 JNP 385. 
Crucial to these offences is the fact that the conduct in question did not meet accepted 
standards of care and that the professional had knowledge, recklessness or a ‘couldn’t-care-
less’ attitude in this regard.58 The wilful neglect offence, for example, is committed where the 
professional deliberately refrained from acting or refrained from acting because of not caring 
whether action was required or not.59 The ill-treatment offence requires deliberate conduct 
which could properly be described as ill-treatment, where the perpetrator either appreciated 
that he was inexcusably ill-treating the patient, or was reckless in this regard.60 Proof of harm, 
such as physical or psychological injury or suffering, or actual or threatened damage to health 
is not required.61  
Clearly these offences which capture substandard medical practice could be used in cases 
involving abuse/mistreatment/neglect of women in labour. For example, if a woman was 
denied pain relief where this denial breached accepted medical standards of care, and where 
the midwife or obstetrician had the requisite degree of fault (i.e. knowledge, recklessness, or 
couldn’t care less attitude with regard to their failure to provide pain relief), the wilful neglect 
offence would arguably be committed. It is unclear the extent to which these offences will be 
effective at capturing autonomy-infringements. Arguably, however, carrying out a medical 
procedure that was either unnecessary or not consented to could constitute ill-treatment.  
A question may arise as to whether it will it be more difficult to prove the legal requirements 
for these crimes in situations where the patient is under the care of medical professionals for a 
relatively short period of time, as may be the case for a woman in labour, and where the 
incident in question involved a one-off failure in care that had no long term or serious 
consequences for the patient?  Arguably not: these offences do not require persistent neglect 
or ill-treatment, and, as noted, proof of harm is not required. However, the decision on 
whether to prosecute may be influenced by whether the woman experienced physical, mental 
or emotional suffering or harm. Indeed, consideration of sufficiency of evidence of the 
offence requirements is only one aspect of the decision, with prosecutors also having to 
consider the likelihood of conviction, based on that evidence, and whether prosecution is in 
the public interest.62  
In this regard, it is plausible that prosecutions will be reserved for particularly egregious 
instances of neglect and ill-treatment, such as those involving vulnerable patients with 
pressing medical needs where the failure in care caused or risked serious suffering or harm. 
In OV cases, will prosecutions be taken against medical staff where ultimately no harm was 
caused/risked to the woman or her baby, notwithstanding the significant distress and 
 
58 See guidance from following cases: R v Newington (1990) 91 Cr App R 247; R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394; R 
v Turbill and Broadway [2014] 1 Cr App R 7; R v Patel [2013] EWCA Crim 965; and Crown Prosecution 
Service (Legal Guidance), Ill-Treatment or Wilful Neglect – Sections 20 to 25 of the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 (17 Oct 2017), available at https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/ill-treatment-or-wilful-
neglect-sections-20-25-criminal-justice-and-courts-act-2015, accessed 19 Nov 2018.  
59 R v Turbill and Broadway [2014] 1 Cr App R 7 
60 R v Newington (1990) 91 Cr App R 247. 
61 R v Newington (1990) 91 Cr App R 247; R v Patel [2013] EWCA Crim 965. 
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indignity she may have suffered due to neglect/ill-treatment during labour, and the longer-
term impact this may have on her? Given what has been said about the impact of gender 
norms and the importance of foetal welfare, will women who report instances of ill-
treatment/neglect encounter disbelief or dismissive attitudes from the police and prosecutors 
and ultimately be less protected than other patients? 
It may also be possible to criminalise some instances of OV, particularly non-consented to 
medical interventions, through NFOAP. These crimes cover non-consented to touching 
(battery), and also situations where harm (physical or psychological) was unlawfully caused, 
either through a battery or other means, through the actual bodily harm (s47), grievous bodily 
harm and wounding offences (s20/18) found in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. A 
key rationale of these crimes is the protection of bodily integrity and autonomy: “[t]he 
fundamental principle, plain and uncontestable, is that every person’s body is inviolate. It has 
long been established that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a 
battery.”63  Although these crimes are not specifically targeted at medical professionals, they 
have, in theory, the potential to capture non-consented to medical treatment.  
Consent plays a vital role in delineating what conduct the criminal law will criminalise in the 
context of NFOAP. In summary, any unconsented to touching outside of what is acceptable 
as part of everyday life constitutes a battery.64 This includes non-consensual medical 
treatment. If surgery was involved, it could constitute the more serious unlawful wounding 
offence (s18/20),65 or, if an unconsented to intervention resulted in some other legally 
recognised harm to the patient (including diagnosed psychiatric harms, such as depression 
and PTSD, but not emotional harms such as fear, anxiety and distress),66 it could amount to 
actual bodily harm67 or grievous bodily harm.68 Mentally competent patients can, therefore, 
refuse medical treatment, even if this refusal would result in serious harm to them or another 
person, including death: no matter how foolish or irrational their decision may appear to be, 
the choices of a mentally competent patient must be respected; non-consensual medical 
treatment is a criminal offence.69   
In legal doctrine, birthing women are not treated differently to other patients. Providing she 
has mental capacity,70 a woman can refuse medical interventions, such as vaginal 
examinations, inductions, episiotomies and caesarean sections, even if this puts, not only her 
own life/health at risk, but also that of the foetus/baby.71  In particular, normative 
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expectations about ‘good motherhood’ and medical imperatives to preserve the life/health of 
mother/foetus/child have no bearing on legal doctrine. As emphasised by the Court of Appeal 
in S v St George’s NHS Trust, the foetus’ ‘need for medical assistance does not prevail over 
[the pregnant woman’s] right. She is entitled not to be forced to submit to an invasion of her 
body against her will, whether her own life or that of her unborn child depends on it’.72  
However, in medical and legal practice it is not so straight-forward. As Farrell and Devaney 
argue, the right to not be compelled to undergo medical treatment does not necessarily mean 
that patients are empowered to make choices about their care: medical hegemony creates a 
‘power asymmetry’ which makes patients vulnerable to paternalistic medical practices.73  As 
noted, women in labour may be particularly vulnerable to having their choices with regard to 
treatment challenged due to gender norms surrounding ‘good motherhood’, the position of 
the foetus as second-patient, and fears of litigation if harm results.74 Because a woman’s 
decisions carry implications not only for her own health but that of the foetus/baby, medical 
professionals may struggle to act in accordance with her wishes if they believe her choices 
endanger the foetus. As Baker et al state: ‘… the power and influence of obstetric hegemony, 
with its philosophy of pathology and a paternalistic model of care enacted within a fetocentric 
environment, acts to control, discipline and disempower women and their bodies during 
childbirth’.75 Normative expectations of ‘good motherhood’ may also affect how women 
make decisions; for example, they may submit to medical treatment they do not want due to 
pressure in the delivery room and/or because they have internalised social norms about their 
obligations as ‘mothers’.76 
The literature on OV shows that consent may be undermined in a variety of subtle and hidden 
ways in the privacy of the delivery room, such as through threats, pressure, exploitation, 
manipulation, deception, inadequate information, or lack of consultation. Although from an 
ethical perspective we may consider that consent obtained in such circumstances is not a true 
consent, the law is more circumspect in its approach. Indeed, although the courts have 
become more willing to find no consent due to deceptions/pressure in the context of sexual 
offences,77 there is little evidence of a similar approach being taken for NFOAP, particularly 
in medical settings.  One problem is that there is limited guidance on the meaning of consent 
in the context of NFOAP;78 another is that, even if we did have a coherent doctrine of 
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consent, it may not, in its generic form, cater well for the particular issues that arise in 
obstetric situations.   
Consent does not require an express oral or written agreement; agreement may be implied 
from the circumstances (e.g. if a patient moved position to allow an examination to be 
conducted). Further, failure to communicate a lack of consent, for example through resistance 
or protest, does not mean that the patient has consented.79 There is the potential for 
misunderstanding, but where this occurs – i.e. where a medical professional mistakenly 
believes a patient was consenting when in fact they were not – they cannot be liable for a 
criminal offence, something which reflects the requirement for blameworthiness in the 
criminal law.80  
In criminal law, the basic consent principles are: consent must be expressly or impliedly 
given; the patient must have mental capacity; and, consent will be vitiated by frauds as to the 
nature or quality of the act or the identity of the perpetrator, and by certain threats.81 There 
are difficulties, however, in determining the precise meaning and scope of these common law 
rules. There is limited case law, particularly regarding medical contexts, and none which 
address unwanted medical interventions on birthing women.  
The general position on frauds is that a deception (which can include a failure to disclose 
information) as to the nature or quality of the conduct82 or the identity of the perpetrator 
negates consent.83 However, there is little guidance on the meaning of ‘nature’ and ‘quality’. 
The only case law from the criminal courts in medical contexts does not offer much insight, 
dealing with situations involving deceptions as to medical qualifications84 or professional 
registration,85 or where the medical procedure was carried out for a wholly non-medical (and 
sexual) purpose.86  
One issue that arises is whether failure to disclose the risks of a procedure would invalidate 
consent. The criminal courts have interpreted ‘nature’ to mean the central features of the 
conduct in question, but to not extend to collateral matters.87 It was held, in the context of 
criminalising HIV transmission through consensual sexual intercourse under NFOAP (as 
section 20/18 offences), that the ‘nature’ of an act includes the risk of harm attached,88 which 
would suggest that failure to disclose to a patient the risks involved in a procedure would 
vitiate consent to that procedure, leaving open the possibility of conviction for a NFOAP. 
However, the approach taken by the courts to consent in the context of civil battery (which is 
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defined in the same way as a criminal battery) suggests that a narrower approach would be 
taken in medical contexts. Although failure to inform a patient about a risk involved in a 
procedure may give rise to a negligence claim, providing inadequate disclosure caused harm 
to the patient,89 the civil courts have refused to find a battery in such situations, in one case 
holding that it would be ‘deplorable’ and ‘insupportable’ to do so, and this is due to the 
implication that a crime had also been committed.90  In civil law battery cases providing the 
patient was ‘informed in broad terms about the nature of the procedure’ there is a true 
consent.91  
To take another example, if a woman is deceived, not about the risks of the treatment but 
about the risks to her/baby of not undergoing that procedure, would this constitute a fraud 
which vitiates consent? Possibly, the deception could be construed as relating to the purpose 
of the act - for example, where the risk to the baby is over-stated and it is said that the 
procedure is necessary to save the baby’s life, arguably this involves a deception as to 
purpose. However, it is unclear whether deceptions as to purpose fall within the scope of 
legally recognised negations of consent.92 One factor that might be relevant in such cases is 
the professional’s reason for the treatment. For example, if they acted out of genuine, albeit  
misguided, concern for the woman and her baby, would the courts be less likely to find 
vitiated consented (i.e. that there was a relevant deception), than in a case where the doctor 
acted for an objectively ‘bad’ motive, such as, for example, to meet targets or for financial 
gain?93  Although the conventional view is that motive is irrelevant on the question of 
whether particular criminal offences have been committed (unless it is a specific offence 
requirement), there is jurisprudence indicating that motive is not always ignored in criminal 
cases. Interestingly, two such cases have involved medical contexts where the doctor’s 
motive appears to have been influential in persuading the court that they had not committed 
an offence.94  
It might be possible to argue that such a deception constituted a threat (e.g. ‘if you don’t 
comply, your baby will die’), but, again, we have limited clarity on when threats suffice to 
negate consent for the purposes of NFOAP.95 To take another example, if a woman agreed to 
treatment she did not want because she was threatened with having her child taken into care 
or with court-authorised medical treatment (e.g. she was told that if she did not consent her 
mental capacity would be challenged and that a court would likely order that the procedure be 
carried out against her will in her best interests), would this vitiate consent? Most likely such 
examples would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, it being for the jury to decide whether 
the nature of the threat/pressure and its impact on the victim meant that her will was 
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overborne so that she submitted, rather than consented to the act in question.96 Medical 
contexts will present particular difficulties. First, it seems likely that ‘threats’ are likely to 
take the more subtle form of pressure, manipulation, persuasion, or exploitation.97 Second, 
some level of persuasion and indeed pressure ought to be acceptable, and medical 
professionals should not be deterred by fear of legal action, and in particular criminalisation, 
from persuading their patients to accept a particular treatment, particularly in situations where 
the treatment is necessary, or highly desirable, to prevent harm to the patient (including harm 
to her baby).   
Finally, there is the issue of mental capacity. On this matter the law is well developed and 
clear, but its application indicates that in practice birthing women’s autonomy is not well 
protected.98 Although there can be no legally valid consent where mental capacity is lacking, 
this does not mean that medical procedures cannot be performed in such cases. Indeed, the 
law facilitates non-consented to medical treatment where a patient lacks capacity, providing 
this is in the patient’s best interests.99 What this means is that if a woman refuses consent to, 
for example, a caesarean section, challenging her mental capacity provides a route to 
facilitating that procedure without risking criminal liability.  
First, section 5 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 allows for clinical judgments about a 
patient’s capacity and best interests to enable lawful medical treatment without the patient’s 
consent. Provided reasonable steps were taken to ascertain mental capacity, and there was a 
reasonable belief that the patient lacked capacity and that the treatment was in her best 
interests, no offence is committed. In essence, this provision enables clinicians to make their 
own determinations about mental capacity, and thus exercise their medical authority to 
determine the patient’s best interests.100 However, Jackson highlights that medical 
professionals do not always understand this test or how to apply it.101  
Medical teams may also avoid criminal liability by seeking a declaration of incapacity and 
court-authorised treatment.102 Indeed, in obstetric cases this is the recommended course of 
action where women who refuse to agree to a proposed procedure (usually a caesarean 
section) are suspected to lack capacity, rather than relying solely on clinical judgments about 
capacity/best interests.103 Whether this happens in practice is another matter. Further, it seems 
the courts only pay lip service to autonomy rights in this context: there have been numerous 
cases of court-authorised caesareans based on incapacity/best interests.104 This is despite the 
fact that in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S a competent pregnant woman’s right to 
refuse medical treatment was upheld, even where this put her own and/or the foetus’ life at 
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risk, and the Court of Appeal clearly recognised the importance of a woman’s autonomy 
rights, which were not diminished by her state of pregnancy.105 
However, despite legal principles which clearly uphold a competent pregnant woman’s right 
to refuse treatment, in practice there has yet to be a case where the issue of whether a 
caesarean could be performed was still live and the courts upheld the woman’s capacity and 
her allowed her refusal of treatment to stand.106  Although the Court of Appeal in St George’s 
did find in the woman’s favour, the procedure had already been carried out. In other words, 
the life/health of the baby was no longer at stake.  As Halliday argues, the decision might 
have been different had it been an emergency situation where the life of the mother/foetus 
was at risk.107   
The court-authorised caesarean case law highlights that the practice of the law may not 
necessarily reflect the legal principles. Although gender norms play no role in the legal rules, 
as Halliday’s analysis of the case law both before and after the St George’s decision 
indicates, there remains significant scope for paternalistic and gendered attitudes to infuse the 
law’s application.108 Indeed, Halliday argues that where medical professionals are of the view 
that a woman’s refusal to consent to a caesarean endangers the foetus, the law on incapacity 
is used as a ‘device’ to order that the procedure be carried out in her best interests.109 Further, 
as Michalowski highlights, although the same legal principles apply, in practice it seems 
women in childbirth are treated differently to other patients in that there are few cases 
involving other patients where the courts have been so willing to authorise medical 
intervention on the grounds of incapacity/best interest.110 Where a woman’s decision to 
refuse treatment threatens foetal safety, the courts seem willing to protect the foetus, despite 
the fact that the law does not support such an approach.111 In fact, Halliday suggests, rather 
than protecting women, the law on capacity ensures they meet the ‘socially constructed view 
of motherhood which requires women to act altruistically, doing whatever is necessary for the 
foetus’.112 
The approach taken in these cases suggests that women who claim that a criminal offence 
was committed against them are likely to meet many obstacles, not least the challenge of 
overcoming normative expectations and how these may affect the interpretation and 
application of the law. In other words, the idea that everyone’s body is inviolate, and that 
everyone has the right to refuse medical treatment may not provide much protection for 
women in obstetric cases, and this is not only due to potential shortcomings in current legal 
doctrine, but also to how gender norms affect the application of legal rules, something that is 
very apparent in how the law has been applied in capacity cases. Indeed, as experiences with 
other gender-based crimes, such as sexual offences, has shown, where crime is embedded in 
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gender norms those same norms also affect how criminal justice actors involved in 
processing the case, from the police through to jurors, interpret and implement the law.113  
Linked to this is the fact that women in such situations may not realise they have been the 
victim of a crime. Ultimately, the violence of the act is invisible to both victims and the 
criminal justice system. As Bibbings has observed in relation to NFOAP in the context of 
domestic violence, victims internalise gender norms and may not interpret what has happened 
to them as ‘violence’:114 ‘the gender of the perpetrator and victims, combined with the 
context in which the violence occurs, has an effect upon whether incidents which potentially 
constitute offences will actually be perceived as such and, if so, reported, charged, prosecuted 
and found to attract criminal liability’.115  
Following the analysis in this section, it is evident that overall the current criminal law 
provides an inadequate response to OV. Of course, the argument could be made that many 
patients may experience similar harms, and that given that specific crimes to target abuse in 
the medical context were created in 2015, surely OV should be dealt with under these 
offences, and, if there are any gaps, these could be closed by the creation of additional 
offences (or amendment to existing offences) to ensure that all patients are equally protected. 
In other words, why should birthing women be treated differently to other patients?  
My suggestion for a specific OV offence is not based on the notion that women in childbirth 
need additional protection compared to other patients, rather that because their experiences 
are different, they require different protection which can take account of and respond to the 
particular circumstances of these cases, notably the following features: unlike with other 
patients whose vulnerability to abuse/mistreatment/violence stems from their physical and/or 
mental weakness and disempowerment due to illness, women in childbirth are not ‘sick’; the 
additional moral and social pressure on women to make decisions, not only for themselves 
but for their unborn children, and in particular that normative expectations of ‘good 
motherhood’ make them vulnerable to unwanted medical interference and abusive care; 
finally, the perception of the foetus as ‘second-patient’, the ethical dilemma faced by medical 
staff where the woman’s decision could lead to death or injury to the foetus, and the 
perceived maternal-foetal conflict that therefore arises, which may make medical 
professionals more willing to cross the line into seriously unprofessional standards of care 
that are properly the concern of the criminal law.  The above analysis argues that existing 
legal doctrine would likely struggle to incorporate these experiences of violence and 
normative understandings would likely affect the interpretation and implementation of the 
law. There is therefore a need for a separate offence that is tailored to address the particular 
factors involved and which can counteract rather than reinforce gender norms in how the law 
is applied. 
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3. The Argument for a Woman-Centred Offence 
Following the analysis in the previous section, there are two arguments in favour of 
establishing a specific offence to target violent obstetric practices: first, to identify and 
properly label the wrong/harm done and in so doing to draw attention to this issue and 
express the community’s intolerance of abuse of women in childbirth; second, to allow for a 
woman-centred approach to the definition and scope of the offence, which acknowledges 
women’s experiences of violence and appreciates the gendered nature of the harm/wrong 
involved.  
First, even if some aspects of OV are captured by existing criminal offences, it may be 
important to explicitly recognise this as a separate crime which properly identifies and labels 
the harms involved. The concept of OV acknowledges as violence incidents that traditionally 
do not attract that label and, in so doing, challenge the minimisation of women’s experience 
of maternity abuse. However, if violence against women in childbirth is subsumed within 
standard criminal law offences, it is hidden, and the public, women themselves, and criminal 
justice officials may not perceive that a crime has been committed; the harm in question is 
not identified and indeed is rendered invisible. The expressive potential of the criminal law is 
also diminished. As McGlynn et al argue with regard to ‘image-based sexual abuse’, ‘shoe-
horning practices into conventional privacy-related offences risks obscuring the nature of the 
abuse and reducing any potential expressive effect of the criminal law’.116 Further, drawing 
on Vera-Gray’s work on street-harrassment, they also highlight the problem of normalisation 
of women’s experiences of abuse – on the street and on-line – and the importance of the 
criminal law, and proper labelling of crimes, to ‘name’ the conduct in question as abuse, thus 
‘reflect[ing] women’s experiences and … resist[ing] minimisation of these forms of harm’.117 
Thus, a statutory crime of ‘OV’, or some other suitably labelled offence, would not only draw 
attention to this issue, it would also allow for identification of the specific harms done to 
women who are victims of serious and blameworthy abusive maternity care, and to resist 
minimization of their experiences.  
Related to this, it is suggested that the state should recognise OV as a crime. As Duff argues, 
certain wrongs118 should be criminalised ‘to mark them out as public wrongs, which must be 
condemned as such, and for which their perpetrators must be called to answer’.119 He sees 
crimes as wrongs that ‘properly concern[] the public’120 because they involve an attack on our 
core community values, and therefore warrant a collective community response.121 In this 
regard, unlike with other forms of regulation, the criminal law can demonstrate societal 
intolerance of violence against birthing women and perform an important expressive 
function. As Yeung and Horder observe in relation to the creation of the 2015 offences, the 
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criminal law is the ‘most powerful and important social institution through which we hold to 
account, and express public censure of, those who mistreat others in a wholly unacceptable 
and highly culpable way.’122   
Second, the law, as it stands, fails to recognise and address the specifically gendered aspects 
of OV. I have focused on the law’s approach to consent, which links in with infringements of 
autonomy and bodily integrity, in the previous section. Arguably there are also other facets of 
the existing law that would fail to accommodate women’s experiences of abuse in childbirth, 
such as for example the law’s limited understanding of  violence and harm (as physical or 
psychological but not emotional harm). The laws discussed in the previous section, 
particularly NFOAP, are ‘male’ laws which were not created to capture the sort of harms 
perpetrated on women by OV. As Bibbings has argued, despite being ostensibly gender 
neutral, these offences are ultimately masculinist in nature.123 Feminist scholarship has 
revealed that the meaning and scope of the criminal law is affected by sex and gender.124 
Thus, for the criminal law to play any role in responding to these situations it needs to take a 
more woman-centred approach to issues such as consent (and autonomy), violence and harm. 
In particular, it should be recognised that the harm involved is one involving autonomy and 
dignity infringements that have gendered roots.  
Further, the concepts of autonomy and choice, so central to the issue of consent for the 
purposes of NFOAP, are male. The traditional conception of autonomy as individualist and 
rationalistic is ‘inextricably bound up with masculine character ideals’.125 This fails to 
capture the position of birthing women. Indeed, it could be said that the whole idea of 
‘choice’ in the context of use of medical interventions in childbirth is suspect.126 As discussed 
above, she is, or least is perceived to be, in a relational rather than an individualistic position 
by virtue of her role in bringing forward human life, something which may affect not only her 
own self-perception with regard to the choices she makes, but also how others, particularly 
medical professionals and those close to her, view her choices and the extent to which she 
should be free to choose when her decision is thought to endanger the foetus. These are issues 
that need to be considered in the criminal law’s understanding of consent. In this regard, 
feminist theories of relational autonomy, allow us to take account of the impact of 
socialization and social relationships on autonomy.127 For instance, in this context it would 
facilitate a better understanding of the impact of oppressive gender norms on the woman’s 
decision making. These feminist critiques of traditional masculinist autonomy and their 
understandings of relational autonomy could help to inform criminal law in any law reform 
agenda.   
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Conclusion 
In approaching the creation of a specific OV offence, we must be cognisant of what 
criminalisation entails – coercive state censure and punishment – and understand that the 
decision to criminalise is not something that should be taken lightly. The fact that the 
criminal law already targets non-consensual medical treatment, albeit not particularly 
effectively in this instance, as well as abusive/negligent treatment of patients by 
doctors/nurses, suggests that criminalisation of this specific aspect of medical care would not 
necessarily be inappropriate. However, it will not always be desirable to criminalise medical 
professionals who mistreat women in childbirth. There is a need to ensure that medical 
professionals are not inhibited from doing their jobs effectively through fear of 
criminalisation, and that there is a clear line between legal and illegal conduct, not forgetting 
that improper or unethical medical treatment does not always merit criminalisation: we are 
only concerned with serious and blameworthy incidents.  
What is crucial to ensure is that the construction of an OV offence is based on the 
understanding that this is a form of gender-based violence. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to suggest a possible framework as a number of issues would need to be explored in 
detail. For now, I suggest that in considering an offence of OV, the approach to harm, 
consent, seriousness, fault, and defences (and other matters), must be informed by the 
experiences of women and must understand the gendered context and the imbalance in power 
in the relationship in which OV occurs. The vulnerable position the woman is in due to the 
role of patriarchal norms and her relationship with the foetus, should be taken account of so 
that the law protects women against normative expectations, rather than drawing on these 
norms to undermine the protection offered by the law.  
Finally, questions may arise about whether criminalisation would be the best outcome for 
women. Women as victims of gendered crimes, such as rape and domestic violence, are often 
revictimized by the criminal justice system; they are disempowered, when the state takes over 
their grievance; and let down when conviction and punishment do not follow. Indeed, as 
Lacey has argued, focusing solely on criminal law doctrine is an inadequate response because 
this does nothing to change cultural attitudes that affect how the criminal law is then 
interpreted and utilised by the police, prosecutors, judges and juries. As the experience with 
rape has shown, irrespective of changes to legal definitions, problematic gender norms – rape 
myths – still play a crucial role in the outcome of these cases.128 This does not mean we 





128 Lacey (n 113) 99.  
